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In this paper we examine the ownership structure of 169 firms 
listed on the Saudi Arabian stock market from 2008 to 2014. The 
analysis uses the testing methodology described by Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985) to examine the effects of firm and market instability on 
Saudi ownership structure and additionally, the effect of systematic 
regulation that imposes constraints on the behaviour of the 
selected listed firms. We find evidence, for the majority of the 
ownership structures considered, in favour of the view that firm 
size, regulation and instability affects ownership structure. The 
results suggest that the size variable has a positive effect on 
ownership concentration. Our analysis also shows that instability 
had some effect on ownership concentration and structure when 
using the non-linear specification, particularly when using firm 
specific instability, albeit the effect was stronger when the 
instability measure was accounting profit returns. Lastly, there is 
evidence that government-owned firms were mostly affected by 
regulation while diffused owned firms were affected most by 
instability than non-government owned firms. 
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Instability, Control Potential.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The study aims to investigate corporate governance 
in Saudi Arabia by focusing exclusively on 
ownership structure and concentration which 
hopefully will reveal whether the specific corporate 
governance practices of firms and the system of 
governance that has emerged in recent times can 
serve as a magnate of capital flows into an economy 
seeking to diversify away from oil dependency. 
Hitherto, the ability of Saudi Arabia to attract 
foreign capital has been limited and has only 
received increasing attention following the global 
financial crisis and the deep economic recession 
that followed which not only led to a decline in the 
global demand for oil and, with it, a rapid fall in the 
price of oil and in oil revenues, culminating in the 
depletion of foreign currency reserves, but also in 
the government having to raise funds in 
international capital markets. At the same time the 
Saudi stock market has witnessed rapid growth and 
the challenge has been for the authorities to 
respond by safeguarding the interest of investors by 
addressing deficiencies in corporate governance and 
by ensuring the proper governance of firms and the 
stock market by identifying and implementing best 
practices. It is interesting in this regard that the 
Saudi authorities implemented improved corporate 
governance codes and practices designed to increase 
transparency and the rights of shareholders.  
The separation of ownership from control 
provides the basic cornerstone upon which 
corporate governance has developed as a way of 
monitoring agency conflict, aligning the interest of 
managers and shareholders and in balancing the 
interest of stakeholders; see Berle and Means (1932), 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997). Of these studies, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
is explicit on the main corporate governance 
mechanism to limit agency costs in light of their 
recognition that a firm is nothing but a complex 
nexus of contracts among the claimants of residual 
claims and cash flows. Given this particular focus, 
corporate governance is not only intrinsic for 
creating stable agency relationships but is also vital 
for the attraction of foreign direct investment and in 
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assuring effective economic growth (i.e. 
diversification and internationalization), and strong 
financial performance. The perceived wisdom is that 
countries with strong governance practices have 
prosperous economies, while those with weak 
governance practices tend to adopt poor managerial 
strategies which only serve to impair the financial 
positions of firms which, in turn, can leave 
shareholders much worse off. The influence that 
certain owners can exert on management is one of 
the vital areas of corporate governance. Owners with 
large equity ownership in the firm have a 
considerable degree of independence and, as such, 
will, more often than not, use their position to exert 
pressure on management. In contrast, more diffused 
ownership is expected to provide managers with 
considerable discretion and latitude in the devise of 
corporate strategy, which encourages higher levels 
of performance. This is a situation that is associated 
with firms with entrenched managers and a high 
level of insider ownership.  
Empirical studies of governance issues in Saudi 
Arabia, including ownership structure, are limited to 
a few areas. Among the recent studies that have 
investigated governance issues include Eljelly 
(2009), Al-Hussain and Johnson (2009), Soliman 
(2013), Al-Sahafi et al. (2015), Al-Ghamadi and 
Rhodes (2015), Alhumoudi (2016), and Buallay et al. 
(2017). Of these studies, Al-Ghamadi and Rhodes 
(2015) examined shareholders holding above 10 per 
cent equity stake in family and non-family owned 
Saudi firms and show that while shareholder 
ownership was positive, its overall effect on firm 
performance was insignificant. Meanwhile, 
Alhumoudi (2016) examined Saudi ownership 
structure focusing, in particular, on managerial and 
shareholder ownership concentration above five 
percent and report that managerial ownership had a 
positive effect on firm performance, while Buallay et 
al. (2017) in examining the impact of corporate 
governance on firm performance found a significant 
and negative effect of the three largest shareholder 
grouping on firm value. What all these studies 
impart is that any empirical study covering 
ownership structures should include a sample that 
takes the corporate landscape of Saudi Arabia into 
consideration, which is what the present study seeks 
to address. 
Our interest in Saudi listed firms is due 
primarily to the economic environment in which 
they operate which is distinct from the legal and 
economic environment found in Europe and North 
America. In fact the data on ownership and control 
shows that Saudi governance system shares little 
similarities with European and North American 
firms. For in these countries private ownership 
dominate, while in Saudi Arabia government 
ownership dominates everywhere. However, with the 
gradual emergence of corporate groupings and the 
involvement of foreign owners ownership and 
control are becoming increasingly concentrated, and 
this therefore have important implications for 
corporate governance. The present study attempts 
to provide additional evidence on the development 
of corporate governance in Saudi Arabia by 
examining ownership structure and concentration in 
Saudi listed firms. The contribution of the study 
written up in the empirical section of this paper is in 
two areas. First, this paper seeks to identify the 
owners of the largest listed firms on the Saudi Stock 
market and to analyse the determinants of control 
consistent with the factors at work in most 
corporate governance systems of the world 
economy by applying the testing framework of 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985). Second, the paper 
analyses the determinants and the effects of 
concentration by exploring the effects of the 
potential endogeneity of control. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. 
Section 2 provides an overview of related literature 
on ownership structure, concentration and 
performance. Section 3 outlines the testing 
methodology on which the empirical investigation 
was undertaken. Section 4 describes the data and 
discusses the preliminary statistics. Section 5 
presents and discusses the results arising from our 
empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Since the work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) which 
report ownership concentration to have a positive 
effect on firm performance – if only because it 
decreased conflicts of interest between managers 
and owners – issues specific to the relationship 
between principal –agent conflict as appeared with 
much frequency in the economics and finance 
literature. With respect to ownership and control, 
the role of corporate ownership and the board of 
directors as governance mechanisms has been 
subject to considerable empirical investigation. One 
angle of research use cross-sectional data to 
interrogate the empirical relationship between 
ownership structure and firm value; see for example 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Morck et al. (1988), 
McConnell and Servaes (1990), Cho (1998), 
Claessens et al. (2000), Ang et al. (2000), and 
Lemmon and Lins (2003), while Lins (2003), 
Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003), Villalonga and Amit 
(2006), and Lin et al. (2011) use panel data. In 
addition, Claessens et al. (2000), Lemmon and Lins 
(2003), Lins (2003), La Porta et al. (2002), and Baek 
et al. (2004) draw on data on listed companies to 
explain the effect of ownership on firm value, while 
Classens et al. (2000) in seeking to identify owner-
controllers and or non-management blockholders 
only deliberate a sample of blockholders owning no 
more than 5 per cent of votes. On the other hand, La 
Porta et al. (2002) draw on the basic idea of the 
‘‘largest blockholder’’ without making the 
distinction between managerial blockholder and 
non-managerial one, which is not the case in the 
present study since we have full knowledge of the 
owner-controller.  
An alternative angle to the studies just 
referenced is the examined view that ownership 
structure and board structure are endogenously 
determined and that the costs and benefits of 
different ownership and board structures tend vary 
across firms. Demsetz (1983), for example supports 
this view when he argued that the ownership 
structure of a firm is an endogenous outcome of 
competitive selection in which various cost 
advantages and disadvantages are balanced to arrive 
at an equilibrium organization of the firm. In this 
meaning, corporate governance mechanisms are 
therefore reflective of a firm’s tradeoffs between 
costs and benefits. And as a result, the particular 
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corporate governance mechanisms in play can be 
expected to vary systematically across firms. To that 
end, there is likely to be no statistical association 
between ownership or board structure and firm 
value. Studies along this line include Demsetz and 
Lehn’s (1985) and the study of Hermalin and 
Weisbach’s (1988) which examined board 
composition. In particular, Demsetz and Lehn’s 
(1985) found instability to have a positive significant 
correlation with ownership concentration. Under 
non-linear form they found that as instability 
increases the concentration of ownership 
diminishes, and that the size of firms displayed a 
negative effect on ownership concentration. 
Ownership concentration was found to be much 
lower in regulated firms than other firms.  
Interestingly, La Porta et al. (1999) take the 
existing ownership structure as an equilibrium 
response to the domestic legal environments that 
firms naturally operate in. As a result, ownership 
variable are endogenous. They also note that most 
firms around the world have concentrated 
ownership structure, with large single shareholders 
who can exercise more power and influence relative 
to their cash flow rights which can of course lead to 
an issue of shareholders using their power for their 
own private personal benefits and not shareholder 
wealth maximisation. La Porta et al. (1999) report 
that many of the ownership structure of the large 
corporations in the 27 developed economies they 
examined were not widely held; that management 
ownership was the more dominant form; that widely 
held firms are more prevalent in countries with 
good shareholder protection; that many large firms 
in countries with poor shareholder protection are 
controlled and managed by families, and that the 
controlling shareholders enjoy power in excess of 
their cash flow rights. They also found that 
ownership is stable over time, which is in sharp 
contrast with the reported findings of Seyhun’s 
(1992) who report that over time management 
shareholding tends to be unstable.  
In examining the effect of ownership on firm 
value, Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Cho (1998), 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), and Lins (2003) 
greeted the endogeneity of ownership and control 
measures, while Claessens and Fan (2002), Lins 
(2003), and Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) 
sidestepped the endogeneity problem. Using 2980 
firms from 9 East Asian countries, Claessens et al. 
(2000) separately measure ownership and control 
and show that separation of ownership and control 
has negative effect on firm value, while also noting 
problems encountered in following all the 
crossholding patterns.  
It’s worth noting that Morck et al. (1988) had in 
fact denounced the findings of Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) using a data sample that included managerial 
ownership, Tobins Q, Leverage, and fixed assets 
relative to sales, which were all variables not used in 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985). Both regulated and 
unregulated firms were included in the overall 
sample – with two sub-samples of 186 firms that 
excluded the regulated sector and a sub-sample of 
135 firms that included unregulated firms only. 
Morck et al. (1988) found evidence of a non-linear 
relationship between ownership concentration and 
firm performance. Weiss and Hilger (2012) also add 
to the ownership concentration and performance 
debate by accounting for endogeneity using models 
that build on Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001). They report a 
curvilinear effect of concentration on firm 
performance, though in controlling for endogeneity 
the relation becomes insignificant. Sanchez-Ballesta 
and Garcia-Meca (2007) and Heugens et al. (2009) 
suggest that one reason for the different results in 
most studies is that they do not account for 
endogeneity and non-linearity. However, Denis and 
McConnell (2003) argued endogenous determination 
does not always yield value maximisation and 
therefore, a performance neutral ownership 
concentration 
Lemmon and Lins (2003), using data on 800 
firms from 8 East Asian countries report that 
separation of ownership and control had a negative 
effect on buy-and-hold returns during the 1997 
Asian economic crisis. For Lemmon and Lins (2003) 
what in fact brings about the negative effect is the 
combination of three conditions. These are 
unexpected shocks which reduce investment 
opportunities; the separation of ownership and 
control, and the existence of management control. 
Lins (2003) using 1433 firms from 18 emerging 
markets where markets for corporate control are 
underdeveloped found that the control-ownership 
wedge not only had a negative effect on firm value 
but also the negative effect was much stronger in 
countries with low shareholder protection, and that 
the negative effect was weaker if there is a non-
managerial block shareholder. Both Lemmon and 
Lins (2003) and Claessens and Fan (2002) present 
evidence in clear support of entrenchments, while 
Lin et al. (2011) report that the gap between control 
and ownership increases funding costs. 
Additionally, we should mention that Nguyen et al. 
(2015) support the view, in their focus of a well-
developed and under-developed market, that 
concentrated ownership acted as a corporate 
governance mechanism in countries with weak 
governance national governance quality. 
Pedersen and Thomsen (1997) followed a 
similar line of investigation to that of Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985) albeit with an additional variable to 
measure capital structure. Using a sample of 350 
firms from across 12 European countries, they 
found similar results reported by Demsetz and 
Lehn. In short, that regulation and firm size had a 
negative effect on ownership concentration and that 
instability or volatility in profits had a positive 
effect on ownership concentration, while the capital 
structure variable had a negative effect on 
ownership concentration. The study, however, did 
not find any relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance. For his part in 
this line of investigation on the causes of ownership 
structure in Brazil, Siqueira (1998) found that 
ownership concentration is affected, to some 
degree, by national regulations and firm size, while 
Instability in profits measured via the ROE displayed 
no effect on the concentration of ownership. 
 
3. DATA COLLECTION 
 
Our objective is to examine empirically the extent to 
which ownership, family, government, foreign and 
dispersed ownership has a profound influence in 
shaping corporate governance in Saudi listed firms. 
We address these issues by constructing a sample of 
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a total of 169 firms with a share listing presence on 
the Saudi Stock Exchange for the period December 
2008 to December 2014. It covers firms which are 
known to be sensitive to issues of corporate 
governance in Saudi Arabia. We utilise annual data 
on ownership concentration which was gathered 
from Mubasher and the Saudi Capital Market 
Authority (CMA), while data on firm returns and 
profit was obtained from Tadawul via Bloomberg 
from December 2008 to December 2014.  
We focus on ownership data based on 
ownership stakes of 5 per cent or more holdings in 
any firm, though there are a few firms where no 
shareholder had more than 5 per cent equity stake. 
In our classification of firms – family owned, foreign 
owned, government owned, and dispersed 
ownership; following Berle and Means (1932) we 
took a 20 per cent equity ownership stake to be the  
level at which an investor would have enough equity  
in a particular firm to render control and then 
proceed to classify them as either family, foreign, 
government, or dispersed ownership firms. In their 
study, Morck et al. (1988) took the range of 20-30 
per cent as being useful for effective meaningful 
control.  
 
3.1. Research design and description of variables  
 
The methodology used to estimate the impact of 
ownership concentration follows Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) which is based on the theory of value 
maximisation and from being able to extract profits 
from having better control over the firm which, it is 
argued, is correlated with the instability of the firm 
and market. The regression equations that will be 
evaluated is represented as follows: 
 
𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖𝐷𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐿 + 𝛽2𝑖𝐷𝐹𝐼𝑁 + 𝛽3𝑖(𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸) + 𝛽4𝑖(𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝑆𝐸.𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑆.𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐴) + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 (1) 
𝑂𝑊𝑁𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖𝐷𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐿 + 𝛽2𝑖𝐷𝐹𝐼𝑁 + 𝛽3𝑖(𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸) + 𝛽4𝑖(𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝑆𝐸.𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑆.𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐴) + 𝛽5𝑖(𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝑆𝐸.𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑆.𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐴)
2 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 (2) 
𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖𝐷𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐿 + 𝛽2𝑖𝐷𝐹𝐼𝑁 + 𝛽3𝑖(𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸) + 𝛽4𝑖(𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝑆𝐸.𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑆.𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐴) + 𝛽5𝑖(𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝑆𝐸.𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑆.𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐴)
2 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 (3) 
𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖𝐷𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐿 + 𝛽2𝑖𝐷𝐹𝐼𝑁 + 𝛽3𝑖(𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸) + 𝛽4𝑖(𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝑆𝐸.𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑆.𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐴) + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 (4) 
𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖𝐷𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐿 + 𝛽2𝑖𝐷𝐹𝐼𝑁 + 𝛽3𝑖(𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸) + 𝛽4𝑖(𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝑆𝐸.𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑆.𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐴) + 𝛽5𝑖(𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝑆𝐸.𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑆.𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐴)
2 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 (5) 
𝐻𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑖𝐷𝑈𝑇𝐼𝐿 + 𝛽2𝑖𝐷𝐹𝐼𝑁 + 𝛽3𝑖(𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸) + 𝛽4𝑖(𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝑆𝐸.𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑆.𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐴) + 𝛽5𝑖(𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵𝑆𝐸.𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑆.𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐴)
2 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 (6) 
 
where:  
 OWNC = the dependent variable employed to 
proxy ownership concentration of firm i in year t;  
 OWNT = the dependent variable employed to 
signal the ownership type, whether family, foreign, 
government owned or dispersed ownership.  
 HI = the Herfindahl index of concentration 
which is calculated as the sum of the squared 
ownership concentration.  
 HIT = the dependent variable Herfindahl 
index of concentration which is calculated as the 
sum of the squared ownership concentration for 
ownership type whether family, foreign, government 
owned or dispersed ownership.  
The independent variables are UTILITY which 
is a dummy variable employed to signal a utility 
firm or a non-utility firm (1 = utility firm; and 0 if a 
non-utility firm). FINANCIAL a dummy variable 
assigned a value of 1 for a financial firm and 0 for a 
non-financial firm. FSIZE is the size of the firm by 
market capitalization in year t. INSTAB is the 
instability of the firm given by SE, STD
S
 and STD
A
, 
and SQ-INSTAB refers to 𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑆
2, and 𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐴
2. 
The above equations will also be re-estimated 
after including squared terms as a means of 
evaluating the existence of non-linear ownership 
effects. Instability could be measured in many ways 
such as, changes in prices, firm market value, firm 
market share, stock return and accounting returns. 
We should mention that Demsetz and Lehn (1985) 
employed three measures of instability which are 
readily available that we similarly utilise in this 
study. First, the standard error (SE) is easily 
obtained from regression of the market model of all 
Saudi firms. Second, Standard Deviation of stock 
market return (STD
S
) and third, the Standard 
deviation of annual accounting profit rates (STD
A
).  
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) predicted a stronger 
association of SE with ownership concentration as 
the more useful instability measure that captures 
the benefits from having control of the firm than 
any other instability measure. SE fluctuation is firm 
specific instability, thus owners and managers can 
have a direct influence upon it. The other instability 
measure (STD
S
) is less firm specific since it is 
influenced by other indirect or uncontrollable 
events, such as an economic event and fiscal policy 
that are outside the control of the firm, but 
nonetheless can be managed. Such external events 
are believed to have some impact on ownership 
concentration as it allows reactionary control over 
the firm. The final instability measure, (STD
A
), must 
however be viewed with caution since, from a 
statistical standpoint, there are fewer data points 
compared to monthly stock market returns due to 
its annual nature. Nonetheless, and despite these 
caveats, it is still useful to include as it offers some 
explanation of the year to year fluctuation of the 
business environment in which the firm operates 
better than stock market returns which takes into 
its account the future prospects of the firm which 
may include business conditions.  
It is widely recognized that accounting data 
takes account of a firm’s past activity as well as any 
carry over entries and thus cannot be 100 per cent 
certain of the best measure of variation that 
accounts for the degree of variation in the 
environment in which the firm conducts its 
business. On that understanding, Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) predict (STD
S
) and (STD
A
) to be second and 
third instability measures respectively to explain 
concentration of ownership.  
The descriptive statistics of the above variables 
are given in Table 1. The standard deviation of HI, 
UTILITY, FINANCIAL, FSIZE, and SE are all much 
larger than the mean, indicating a more disperse 
data. The standard deviation of OWNC, STD
S
 and 
STD
A
 are smaller than the mean indicating a more 
tightly spread data. The correlation matrix in Panel 
B indicates that there is significant multicollinearity 
among the three variables. In particular, the two 
ownership concentration variables are more 
correlated, which suggest that we should expect 
empirical estimates that are quite similar. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Observations Mean Std Dev. Minimum Maximum 
OWNC 931 41.55 20.89 5 95 
HI 931 11.65 13.62 0.25 90.25 
UTILITY 1183 0.01 0.11 0 1 
FINANCIAL 1183 0.28 0.45 0 1 
FSIZE 1037 9320.80 26766.61 133.5 334500 
SE 1183 0.30 3.13 -7.06 2.90 
STD
S
 1183 13.64 8.33 6.14 32.00 
STD
A
 1183 10.64 1.07 9.06 12.57 
 
Panel B: Correlation matrix 
 
 OWNC HI FSIZE 
OWNC 1   
HI 
0.767*** 
(0.000) 
1  
FSIZE 
0.309*** 
(0.000) 
0.398*** 
(0.000) 
1 
Note: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The P-Value are in 
parentheses. 
 
Table 2 presents the frequency distribution 
pertaining to the concentration of ownership stakes 
held in Saudi listed firms. The statitistics show that 
90% of the ownership lies between ownership 
concentration intervals 9.5%–72.5%, which is further 
distributed in a range between 102–133 different 
ownership stakes for each category. Less than 5% of 
the ownership stakes lie within the <9.5% interval 
and less than 5% of the ownership stakes lie in the 
highest  ownership  concentration  invervals of 
72.5% –100%. Notably the frequency distribution for 
the Herfindahl Index of ownership concentration 
reveal that the data is skewed, with 58% of 
ownership stakes within the <9.5 interval, almost 
20% of the data in the 9.5–18.5 interval, 13% of the 
data in the 18.5–27.5 interval, and the remaining 10 
% of ownership data in the larger combined interval 
between 18.5 and 100. 
 
Table 2. Frequency distribution of ownership concentration 
 
Interval % Midpoint Frequency Relative % Cumulative % 
  5% FSIZE HI 5% FSIZE HI 5% FSIZE HI 
<9.5 5 45 541 4.83 58.11 4.83 58.11 
9.5 – 18 14 128 181 13.75 19.44 18.58 77.55 
18.5 – 27.5 23 105 118 11.28 12.67 29.86 90.23 
27.5 – 36.5 32 133 39 14.29 4.19 44.15 94.41 
36.5 – 45.5 41 102 17 10.96 1.83 55.10 96.24 
45.5 – 54.5 50 127 16 13.64 1.72 68.74 97.96 
54.5 – 63.5 59 117 8 12.57 0.86 81.31 98.82 
63.5 – 72.5 68 133 2 14.29 0.21 95.60 99.03 
72.5 – 81.5 77 21 2 2.26 0.21 97.85 99.25 
81.5 – 90.5 86 13 1 1.40 0.11 99.25 99.36 
>90.5 95 7 6 0.75 0.64 100 100 
Total  931 931     
 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
In estimating Equation (1) through to (6), we use 
data for up to 169 firms for the period 2008–2014. 
The empirical results of our empirical estimates are 
reported in Tables 3 and 4. In these tables the 
estimates are offered for ownership concentration 
and the categories of ownership present in the Saudi 
economy, namely family, foreign, government, and 
dispersed ownership. In relation with these 
ownership types we discuss the effects of various 
independent variables measuring instability on two 
dependent variables (LOWNC and LHI) using 
multiple linear regression analysis. In Table 4 the 
dependent variables used are LOWNC and LHI 
respectively. The independent variables are SE, STD
S
, 
STD
A
, UTILITY, FINANCIAL and FSIZE which captures 
the effects of firm size. In the non-linear regression 
model, additional squared values of instability are 
included, represented by [SE]2, [STD
S
]2 and [STD
A
]2. 
We first examine ownership concentration and 
report the regression results of Eq. (1,2,4,5) in 
Table 3. The major variable of interest for 
ownership concentration is FSIZE, which as the 
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statistics indicate has a small positive coefficients 
that are significant at the 5% and 1% level, indicating 
therefore that the size of Saudi firms have a small 
positive effect on ownership concentration. Based 
on the existing theory and the empirical literature 
we expect, a priori, a negative association between 
ownership concentration and the size variable in 
accordance with the findings of Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985), but the opposite results was found. We 
interpret this to suggest that Saudi investors view 
firm size to evidence security and are more than 
willing to increase their shareholdings as a result. 
This particular observation is not surprising as 
Siqueira (1998) found a statistically significant zero 
correlation between the size of Brazilian stocks and 
ownership concentration which he suggests could 
be partly due to the financing decision of Brazilian 
firms, (i.e. owners prefer more debt finance over the 
issuing of shares thereby maintaining control while 
keeping their ownership stake in tact). Notably, 
Pedersen and Thomsen (1997) found a negative 
effect of size in European stocks similar to the 
results of Demsetz and Lehn, while Weiss and Hilger 
(2012) report a significant negative association with 
market capitalisation (firm size) and ownership 
concentration. Importantly, systematic regulation, as 
gauged by UTILITY and FINANCIAL, has a positive 
effect on ownership concentration, though none are 
significant in either the linear or non-linear 
specifications. With respect to this, Siqueira (1998) 
report a significant positive effect of UTILITY and 
financial firms on ownership concentration, while 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) report a negative effect of 
systematic regulation on ownership concentration 
of US firms. On this issue, Pedersen and Thomsen 
(1997) note that regulation had a negative effect on 
ownership concentration for a sample of European 
firms, while Weiss and Hilger (2012) report 
regulation to have a negative and insignificant 
association with ownership concentration.  
The SE which gauges firm specific instability is 
not however significant in the linear model, though 
it should be noted that when the term [SE]2 is 
included the results show a small positive and 
significant coefficient of 0.011 at the 10% level and 
0.003 at the 5% level for [SE] and [SE]2 respectively. 
This suggests that non-linear firm ownership 
concentration may perhaps be better explained by 
firm specific instability and that with increasing 
levels of firm specific instability, [SE] and [SE]2, the 
degree of ownership concentration increases, 
thereby lending mild support to the theory of 
control potential that owners increase their stake in 
the firm in order to benefit from having more 
effective control over the company (Demsetz and 
Lehn, 1985). We should also note that the instability 
coefficients although significantly positive are both 
close to zero.  
In terms of the results from both linear and 
non-linear models which employ STD
S
 to capture 
stock market instability. Neither variables are 
significant and their coefficients are close to zero, 
suggesting that stock market instability, [STD
S
] and 
[STD
S
]2, have no effect on ownership concentration 
which does rather lend support to the theory of 
control potential as owners are less likely to be able 
to control market wide events that occur and affect 
all firms which evidently is not within the ambit of 
direct control of owners. Under such circumstances, 
all that owners can do is to allow managers to 
devise appropriate strategies in order to manage the 
changing conditions. The findings here are not 
significant as those for the firm specific instability 
variable, (SE), in which owners can exert more 
effective control. Likewise the findings from both 
linear and non-linear models which employ 
accounting instabilities, STD
A
 and [STD
A
]2, reveal 
STD
A
 in the linear model to have no significant 
effect on ownership concentration, though when the 
non-linear model is applied both STD
A
 and [STD
A
]2 
becomes significant at the 1% level. We also find 
evidence of a strong negative effect of STD
A
 on 
ownership concentration which indicate that when 
there is increasing instability in accounting returns 
owners view this negatively and reduce their 
concentration of ownership. This is a spontaneous 
response on the part of owners which is in 
accordance with the theory which argues that 
owners will not invest in companies with volatile 
accounting earnings.  
We find the variable, [STD
A
]2, to be significant 
and positive which is suggestive that at higher 
values of accounting instability ownership 
concentration is likely to increase, but only to a 
degree. The coefficient, although positive, is close to 
zero. Particularly noteworthy is that there are Saudi 
listed firms where a single shareholder owns more 
than 90% of a firm’s equity. Such shareholders 
would be inclined to take a long term view of the 
firm – one with greater control and amenity 
potential.  
In Panel A of Table 3, the significance of the 
coefficients suggests that investors place more 
emphasis on accounting returns in preference to 
overall stock market returns. This is for two 
reasons. First, accounting returns is more firm 
specific and direct and second, accounting 
instability is more useful for control purposes. In 
order of preference, firm specific instability takes 
second place because control is considered 
important for increase potential profits. Firm size is 
also seen to have a positive effect on ownership 
concentration, while systematic regulation as no 
effect on ownership concentration. Notably, R2 
ranges between 5.5 % and 6.1%. 
In Panel B of Table 3, the regression estimates 
for our ownership variable LHI are overall in line 
with the reported results in panel A. Systematic 
regulation, UTILITY and FINANCIAL, have a positive 
coefficient and insignificant effect on ownership 
concentration. The effects of Instability on our 
ownership variable LHI are consistent with the 
estimates reported in panel A. Here the stand out 
coefficient is the size variable which is insignificant 
apart from the last regression in which the variable 
is mildly positive and significant at the 10% level. 
Hence there is little evidence here to support the 
estimate reported in panel A that the FSIZE variable 
has a positive effect on ownership concentration, as 
measured via the LHI. Aside from the main 
differences, the sign of the coefficient is consistent 
with the reported values in panel A. This is not too 
surprising, since both ownership concentration 
variables, LOWNC and LHI, are related. The R2 ranges 
from 4.6% to 5.7%. 
Hitherto, the reported results are in sharp 
contrast with the findings of Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) for we find positive coefficients for all 
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systematic regulation variables for both Utility and 
Financial, though this was not highly significant. 
Particularly, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) found the 
systematic regulation variables to be of the opposite 
sign with significant negative coefficients, while 
their results indicate a decrease in the concentration 
of ownership for regulated firms. On account of the 
reported empirical estimates we are, however, 
unable to draw any firm deductions about the 
effects of regulation on Saudi Arabian firms because 
while the coefficients were all positive they were not 
altogether significant.  
Comparing the overall results obtained on the  
impact of INSTAB on ownership concentration, we 
find the results are in the opposite direction to 
Demsetz  and  Lehn  (1985)  and  Pedersen and 
Thomsen (1997). Further, they were only significant 
in the non-linear form for instability measures SE 
and STD
A
 in this study. Siqueira (1998) investigated 
instability using the standard deviation of the return 
on equity only and found no significant evidence to 
show volatility in the ROE has any impact on the 
concentration of ownership. Weiss and Hilger (2012) 
found their risk variables to have a positive impact 
on ownership concentration both in the linear and 
non-linear regression specification.  
 
Table 3. Ownership structure 
 
Panel A: Ownership Structure 
 
 LOWNC LOWNC LOWNC LOWNC LOWNC LOWNC 
CONSTANT 
3.475*** 
(.059) 
3.445*** 
(.061) 
3.485*** 
(.061) 
3.510*** 
(.073) 
3.584*** 
(.105) 
6.690*** 
(.819) 
UTILITY 
0.343 
(0.451) 
0.338 
(0.451) 
0.344 
(0.455) 
0.345 
(0.451) 
0.346 
(0.450) 
0.324 
(0.446) 
FINANCIAL 
0.146 
(0.097) 
0.145 
(0.097) 
0.145 
(0.097) 
0.145 
(0.097) 
0.146 
(0.097) 
0.142 
(0.096) 
FSIZE 
2.26e−06** 
(1.08e−06) 
2.36e−06** 
(1.08e−06) 
2.20e−06** 
(1.07e−06) 
2.15e−06** 
(1.07e−06) 
2.10e−06** 
(1.07e−06) 
2.88e−06*** 
(1.08e−06) 
SE 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
0.011* 
(0.006) 
    
[SE]2  
0.003** 
(0.001) 
    
STD
S 
  
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
  
[STD
S
]2    
0.000 
(0.000) 
  
STD
A 
    
-0.010 
(0.008) 
-0.593*** 
(0.153) 
[STD
A
]2      
0.027*** 
(0.007) 
R2 5.6% 5.7% 5.6% 5.6% 5.5% 6.1% 
 
Panel B: Herfindahl index 
 
 LHI LHI LHI LHI LHI LHI 
CONSTANT 
1.723*** 
(.108) 
1.682*** 
(.110) 
1.728*** 
(.111) 
1.799*** 
(.127) 
1.914*** 
(.174) 
5.242*** 
(1.299) 
UTILITY 
0.766 
(0.837) 
0.760 
(0.839) 
0.764 
(0.843) 
0.768 
(0.837) 
0.767 
(0.834) 
0.742 
(0.831) 
FINANCIAL 
0.184 
(0.171) 
0.183 
(0.171) 
0.183 
(0.171) 
0.184 
(0.171) 
0.184 
(0.171) 
0.181 
(0.170) 
FSIZE 
2.37e−06 
(1.78e−06) 
2.51e−06 
(1.77e−06) 
2.43e−06 
(1.76e−06) 
2.24e−06 
(1.77e−06) 
2.32e−06 
(1.75e−06) 
3.24e−06* 
(1.78e−06) 
SE 
0.001 
0.005 
0.018* 
(0.009) 
    
[SE]2  
0.004** 
(0.002) 
    
STD
S
 
 
 
-0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.010 
(0.009) 
  
[STD
S
]2    
0.000 
(0.000) 
  
STD
A
 
 
   
-0.018 
(0.013) 
-0.643*** 
(0.242) 
[STD
A
]2      
0.029*** 
(0.011) 
R2 4.8% 4.9% 4.9% 4.6% 4.8% 5.7% 
 
The FSIZE variable was also in the opposite 
direction to that reported by Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) and Pedersen and Thomsen (1997). And 
although the generated estimates yielded positive 
and significant coefficient with LOWNC, this was not 
significant in the LHI regression which yielded small 
positive coefficients. We should add that Demesetz 
and Lehn (1985) and Pedersen and Thomsen (1997) 
also displayed very small negative coefficients on 
the effects of firm size on ownership concentration, 
while Siqueira (1998) reported no correlation 
between ownership concentration and the size of 
Brazilian firms. 
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Table 4. Ownership types 
 
Panel A: Family ownership 
 
 LOWNC LOWNC LOWNC LHI LHI LHI 
CONSTANT 
3.582*** 
(.074) 
3.55*** 
(.085) 
5.606*** 
(.922) 
2.493*** 
(.181) 
2.537*** 
(.240) 
5.599* 
(3.335) 
UTILITY 
- 
 
- - - - - 
FINANCIAL 
0.131 
(0.413) 
0.185 
(0.406) 
0.097 
(0.412) 
-1.094 
(1.024) 
-1.164 
(1.009) 
-1.188 
(1.026) 
FSIZE 
1.49e−06 
(1.33e−06) 
1.02e−06 
(1.35e−06) 
1.80e−06 
(1.35e−06) 
4.55e−06 
(4.99e−06) 
5.27e−06 
(4.98e−06) 
5.47e−06 
(5.04e−06) 
SE 
0.001 
(0.006) 
  
0.000 
(0.024) 
  
[SE]2 
0.002 
(0.001) 
  
-8.32e−06 
(0.005) 
  
STD
S 
 
0.006 
(0.006) 
  
-0.003 
(0.023) 
 
[STD
S
]2  
-0.000 
(0.000) 
  
-0.000 
(0.001) 
 
STD
A 
  
-0.386** 
(0.172) 
  
-0.562 
(0.622) 
[STD
A
]2   
0.018** 
(0.008) 
  
0.025 
(0.029) 
R2 6.2% 4.9% 6.9% 6.8% 7.6% 7.6% 
 
Panel B: Foreign ownership 
 
 LOWNC LOWNC LOWNC LHI LHI LHI 
CONSTANT 
3.478*** 
(.095) 
3.523*** 
(.102) 
4.183*** 
(.863) 
2.252*** 
(.331) 
2.556*** 
(.374) 
8.640** 
(3.441) 
UTILITY - - - - - - 
FINANCIAL 
0.002 
(0.083) 
-0.005 
(0.082) 
0.007 
(0.083) 
0.311 
(0.311) 
-0.033 
(0.313) 
0.069 
(0.314) 
FSIZE 
-1.22e−06 
(2.11e−06) 
-1.45e−06 
(2.15e−06) 
-6.06e−07 
(2.09e−06) 
-5.21e−07 
(8.22e−06) 
-2.42e−06 
(8.35e−06) 
3.02e−06 
(8.27e−06) 
SE 
0.006 
(0.006) 
  
0.047* 
(0.024) 
  
[SE]2 
0.001 
(0.001) 
  
0.010** 
(0.005) 
  
STD
S 
 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
  
-0.022 
(0.024) 
 
[STD
S
]2  
0.000 
(0.000) 
  
0.001 
(0.001) 
 
STD
A 
  
-0.127 
(0.163) 
  
-1.169* 
(0.653) 
[STD
A
]2   
0.006 
(0.008) 
  
0.053* 
(0.030) 
R2 5.6% 7.6% 3.3% 0.51% 0.09% 0.8% 
 
Panel C: Government ownership 
 
 LOWNC LOWNC LOWNC LHI LHI LHI 
CONSTANT 
3.699*** 
(.081) 
3.710*** 
(.089) 
3.016*** 
(.716) 
2.722*** 
(.158) 
2.836*** 
(.184) 
3.213* 
(1.760) 
UTILITY 
0.663* 
(0.360) 
0.661* 
(0.360) 
0.664* 
(0.362) 
1.215* 
(0.688) 
1.215* 
(0.704) 
1.210* 
(0.682) 
FINANCIAL 
-0.068 
(0.147) 
-0.067 
(0.147) 
-0.068 
(0.148) 
-0.459 
(0.282) 
-0.459 
(0.289) 
-0.461* 
(0.280) 
FSIZE 
6.99e−07 
(5.48e−07) 
7.70e−07 
(5.42e−07) 
6.57e−07 
(5.53e−07) 
1.32e−06 
(1.32e−06) 
1.29e−06 
(1.31e−06) 
1.50e−06 
(1.33e−06) 
SE 
0.001 
(0.005) 
  
0.009 
(0.013) 
  
[SE]2 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
  
0.001 
(0.002) 
  
STD
S 
 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
  
-0.014 
(0.012) 
 
[STD
S
]2  
0.000 
(0.000) 
  
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
STD
A 
  
0.132 
(0.134) 
  
-0.071 
(0.329) 
[STD
A
]2   
0.006 
(0.006) 
  
0.002 
(0.015) 
R2 22.7% 23.3% 22.3% 24.2% 24.1% 24.9% 
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Table 4. Ownership types (continued) 
 
Panel D: Dispersed ownership 
 
 LOWNC LOWNC LOWNC LHI LHI LHI 
CONSTANT 
3.144*** 
(.082) 
3.203*** 
(.102) 
6.643*** 
(1.237) 
1.133*** 
(.147) 
1.237*** 
(.173) 
4.482** 
(1.873) 
UTILITY - - - - - - 
FINANCIAL 
0.239 
(0.151) 
0.244 
(0.155) 
0.229 
(0.148) 
0.388 
(0.278) 
0.394 
(0.281) 
0.378 
(0.275) 
FSIZE 
4.39e−06 
(3.18e−06) 
3.56e−06 
(3.20e−06) 
5.80e−06* 
(3.20e−06) 
-2.96e−06 
(5.04e−06) 
-1.35e−06 
(5.69e−06) 
1.33e−06 
(5.11e−06) 
SE 
0.013 
(0.009) 
  
0.019 
(0.013) 
  
[SE]2 
0.003** 
(0.002) 
  
0.004 
(0.003) 
  
STD
S 
 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
  
-0.009 
(0.012) 
 
[STD
S
]2  
0.000 
(0.000) 
  
0.000 
(0.000) 
 
STD
A 
  
-0.642*** 
(0.230) 
  
-0.607* 
(0.349) 
[STD
A
]2   
0.029*** 
(0.011) 
  
0.028* 
(0.016) 
R2 3.89% 3.54% 4.6% 1.53% 1.3% 1.92% 
Note: Where ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The standard errors 
are in parentheses. 
 
We next examine ownership structure by type – 
that is whether ownership structure is 
predominantly family owned, foreign owned, 
government owned or dispersed ownership and, in 
addition, whether such ownership types are 
influenced by regulation, size and instability. The 
results reported in Table 4, Panels A – D follows a 
statistical approach that is close to the methodology 
described by Demsetz and Lehn (1985).  
Table 4, Panel A reports empirical estimates for 
family owned firms using both measures of 
ownership concentration LOWNC and LHI. Utility is 
omitted as there are no family owned firms 
operating in the Saudi Arabia utility sector. Results 
in Table 4A reveal the financial sector coefficients to 
be positive and insignificant for all the models. 
Instability measures SE, [SE]2, STDS and [STDS]
2 are 
all very close to zero and not significant. Note that 
the coefficients on STD
A 
and [STD
A
]2 are both 
significant at the 5% level when using LOWNC, which 
is consistent with the results reported in Table 3. 
This implies that family owned firms tend to be 
more influenced by annual accounting figures than 
by the overall stock market and is moreover firm 
specific. This is to be expected, since any firm 
specific investment decision is likely to be based on 
accounting returns. It may also be due to the fact 
that founding members and family members 
continue to hold a large proportion of stocks for the 
purpose of maintaining a firm grip of control over 
the firm. Therefore year-to-year fluctuation in 
annual returns would not be cause for to too much 
concern as it would be for smaller investors in 
countries such as, for example, the United States 
and the United Kingdom that have more dispersed 
ownership structure. This may be the reason why 
the instability coefficient, measured via STD
A
, in 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) was weakly significant in 
comparison with our reported estimates. In 
addition, the LHI estimates indicate that none of the 
variables included in the regression had a significant 
effect on ownership concentration. The same is true 
for the financial variable, the coefficient of which is 
negative and insignificant. 
It appears that there are fundamental 
differences in the Saudi market compared with 
industrialized economies such as, for example, the 
United States, United Kingdom and other 
industrialized economies with established stock 
markets, because Saudi Arabia is an emerging 
market economy with a stock market that does not 
have a long history. And although market 
capitalisation of firms is of a respectable size, the 
stock market is by no means broad and deep as are, 
for example, the stock markets of the United States 
and the United Kingdom. Thus it may be the case 
that the large concentration of ownership accounts 
for the opposite results to that reported by Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985). 
Table 4, Panel B presents the results for foreign 
owned firms for both ownership measures LOWNC 
and LHI. The Utility variable is once again excluded 
from the regression for the reason that there are no 
foreign firms operating in the Saudi Arabia utility 
sector. The estimated coefficients of regulation and 
size have no significant effect on ownership and are 
moreover close to zero. The same is true for the 
estimated coefficient INSTAB which indicates no 
significant effect on ownership. Findings in relation 
to the effects on LHI suggest that regulation and 
financial have only a mild effect on LHI in 
comparison to LOWNC, though this is by no means 
significant. There is also little support for the SIZE 
variable as there is no significant effect on LHI. 
The coefficient INSTAB, SE, [SE]2, for example, 
are 0.047 and 0.01, respectively. The two 
coefficients are statistically significantly at 10% and 
5% respectively, which implies that an increase in 
firm specific instability results in a marginal 
increase in ownership concentration (LHI) in both 
linear and non-linear specifications. It is also 
notable that the signs of the coefficients of STD
A
 
and [STD
A
]2 show a significant effect on LHI at the 
10% level, suggesting that in the linear estimation 
instability is negatively related to ownership 
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concentration, whereas in the non-linear form there 
is a positive association with ownership 
concentration, which suggests that when market 
instability is heightened ownership concentration 
increases. The estimated coefficient STD
S
 and [STD
S
]2 
indicate no significant effect on LHI. In his study of 
the degree of ownership concentration of Brazilian 
quoted firms, Siqueira (1998), for example, included 
a coefficient dummy “Nation” to ascertain the 
degree of ownership concentration of foreign firms. 
The reported findings indicate that subsidiaries of 
foreign companies displayed a greater degree of 
ownership concentration than was evidenced for 
Brazilian firms.  
The results for government owned firms are 
tabulated in Table 4, Panel C. The specific 
systematic regulation effects, as represented by the 
coefficient UTILITY, enter with a positive and 
significant effect on ownership concentration at the 
10% level for both ownership concentration 
measures. Findings in relation to financial firms 
indicate a negative insignificant association with 
concentration, though in the LHI model that 
incorporates STD
A
 it is statistically negative and 
significant at the 10% level. We should note that the 
SIZE variable has no significant effect on ownership 
concentration. In respect of the INSTAB coefficients, 
these highlight no significant effect on ownership 
concentration. 
The lack of significance in government owned 
firms in comparison with the other ownership types 
so far discussed points to other reason why the 
Saudi government may wish to maintain a large 
ownership stake and a firm grip of control over 
those firms. These perhaps might be for strategic 
reasons, while the RECEIVED wisdom is that 
government owned companies should function in 
the interest of Saudi citizens. The latter reason may 
well explain the significant effect of UTILITY on 
government ownership concentrations. The R2 here 
is higher compared to other ownership types and 
ranges from 22.3% to 24.9%.  
Table 4, Panel D displays the results for 
dispersed firm ownership – that is, firms with no 
ownership majority above 20%. Findings in relation 
to the ownership concentration regression using 
LOWNC and LHI indicate a positive effect of 
systematic regulation (FINANCIAL) on the 
concentration of ownership but is not significant. 
Additionally, it is worth noting that the SIZE variable 
has a significant effect on LOWNC in the regression 
which incorporates STD
A
 and shows that SIZE can 
have a positive, albeit a small effect on the 
concentration of dispersed ownership.  
We find that the coefficient SE in both the 
LOWNC and LHI regression were insignificant. While 
in contrast, the coefficient [SE]2 in LOWNC is positive 
and significant at the 5% level, suggesting that an 
increase in firm specific instability has only a small 
but positive effect on ownership concentration. 
Whereas, the coefficient [SE]2 in LHI is not 
significant. We should add that the instability 
coefficients STD
A
 and [STD
A
]2 are also significant. 
Turning to the LOWNC regression, the coefficient 
STD
A
 has a large and negative effect at the 1% level 
in the linear regression suggesting a reduction in 
ownership concentration. Under the non-linear 
regression, the coefficient [STD
A
]2 is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting 
that at higher levels of market instability ownership 
concentration increases. Similar conclusions are 
reached for the LHI regression for the coefficients 
STD
A
 and [STD
A
]2, though only at the 10% level. The 
coefficient of STD
A
 is much larger for dispersed 
ownership in comparison with the other types of 
ownerships, followed by family owned firms. We 
also find that the INSTAB coefficients STD
S
 and 
[STD
S
]2 are statistically insignificant in both the 
LOWNC and LHI regression, which is consistent with 
the other types of ownership structure. The results 
here are interpreted as evidence that investors 
perhaps give more attention not only to firm 
specific instability, but also to the firm’s annual 
accounting figures, which is to be expected since 
investors can exert more pressure on the firm 
during times of market instability and 
underperformance. This is in sharp contrast to the 
findings of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) who report 
accounting instability to have the least effect on 
ownership concentration. One reason for our results 
may be due to the way in which investors in Saudi 
Arabia view stock market investing which is with 
much circumspection and thus explain why Saudi 
investors put more emphasis on accounting figures 
than on volatile stock market returns.  
Finally, we find that the coefficient FINANCIAL 
is insignificant, for all ownership type which is 
inconsistent with the findings of Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) and would seem to suggest that in the United 
States markets regulation oversight has the 
potential effect of limiting control, which is not the 
case in Saudi Arabia. This is because regulated Saudi 
firms could benefit from better and improved 
systems of corporate governance. However, it is also 
worth noting that dispersed firms are grouped 
together as there is no single shareholder that holds 
more than 20% of the equity. 
 
5. CONCLUSION  
 
We study ownership structure by adapting the 
framework of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) to a sample 
of firms listed on the Saudi stock market covering 
the period 2008 to 2014. We are particularly 
interested in how ownership structure permutated 
based on the size of the firm, market instability and 
systematic regulation which hopefully will reveal 
how far corporate governance structures have 
permeated the corporate landscape of Saudi Arabia 
and have created conditions that improved the 
capabilities inside Saudi listed firms. The results 
indicate that firm size had a positive effect on Saudi 
stock market ownership concentration and that 
instability had the most significant effect on 
ownership concentration suggesting that volatility 
in firm returns results in a slight increase in 
ownership concentration, while under the non-linear 
regression approach there is an initial negative 
effect on ownership concentration but at higher 
levels of instability there is an increase in ownership 
concentration. This is most apparent when 
instability is interrogated using accounting profit 
rates. The results on Instability were obtained using 
the Herfindahl Index as ownership concentration, 
though the effect on the SIZE variable was largely 
insignificant. Systematic regulation, gauged by using 
FINANCIAL and UTILITY firms as proxies indicate no 
significant effect on ownership concentration. 
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Meanwhile, it was found that the non-linear 
regression explained ownership concentration much 
better than the linear specification, while instability 
in accounting profit rates is found to have greater 
importance in the ownership held in Saudi listed 
firms followed by firm specific instability.  
Among the main findings of this study are that 
(a) ownership concentration in Family owned firms 
were affected only by the instability in annual 
accounting profit rates; (b) foreign owned firms 
displayed significant effects of Instability as 
measured by SE and accounting STD on the HI 
measure of ownership concentration; (c) dispersed 
ownership displayed the squared SE and squared 
accounting STD measures of instability displayed 
the most significant positive effect on ownership 
structure. The Accounting STD was significant and 
showed that measured linearly instability leads to a 
decrease in ownership concentration. Under non-
linearity, higher levels of accounting profit 
instability led to an increase in ownership 
concentration. The effect of accounting Instability 
was greatest for dispersed owned firms than for the 
other ownership structures included in our sample; 
(d) firm size was found to affect ownership 
concentration positively in the regression which 
analyses the effects of accounting STD; (e) instability 
measured via stock market STD displayed no 
significant effect on ownership concentration, as in 
the remaining results; (f) government owned firms 
displayed only a significant effect to systematic 
regulation measured and in the FINANCIAL variable 
only in the non-linear regression with the 
accounting STD as the instability, using the HI as the 
ownership measure. This could be partly influenced 
by the fact that all utility firms in the sample were 
government owned firms. The important point here 
is that no other variables were significant and may 
suggest that government ownership are beyond the 
reasons why a normal investor would hold shares – 
for example wealth maximisation – and that there 
might be other reasons for the existence of 
government ownership which may include social, 
political and national reasons, but not necessarily 
profit maximisation as their primary goal. 
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